Kathmandu, 26 April: The ongoing US–Israeli war against Iran has created a major opportunity for Russia and China. Both Moscow and Beijing view this conflict as a chance to weaken American interests in West Asia and beyond.
Both countries appear eager to use this war to erode US power, gather intelligence on American military systems, and undermine the US-led global order. To achieve this, they are exploring various diplomatic, military, direct, and indirect options. So far, both nations seem to be succeeding in their objectives.
The difficult situation faced by Russian forces in Ukraine provides a model of how Moscow and Beijing seek to inflict damage on the United States. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the US government has supported Kyiv not only to assist a small democratic country against a larger authoritarian neighbor but also for broader strategic reasons.
The war in Ukraine helps tie down American rivals, weakens Russian power, and imposes billions of dollars in costs on the Kremlin each year. Russia’s struggle to defeat a comparatively weaker opponent has also damaged perceptions of its military capability. At the same time, Moscow has been forced to mobilize more troops, ammunition, and military resources just to maintain a stalemate. Meanwhile, the US can study Russian military strategies, technologies, and operations in greater depth through this conflict.
The Biden administration has also viewed its support for Ukraine as a way to reaffirm Washington’s position as the leader of a “rules-based international order.” Due to fears that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine could lead to further territorial expansion, the US has successfully united like-minded powers and isolated Moscow.
In the case of Iran, Russia and China now see an opportunity to turn the situation against the United States. Both believe that an America entangled in endless wars in West Asia will create fewer problems for them.
In fact, during the 20 years following the September 11 attacks, while the US was bogged down in wars in West Asia, China’s global position improved significantly. As India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar famously remarked, “For two decades, China was winning without fighting in West Asia, while America was fighting without winning.”
Moscow and Beijing now want to benefit from Washington’s distraction in the region. It is in their interest to trap the US in a slow, prolonged, low-intensity conflict that drains American resources and weakens its global standing. Both countries have the necessary tools to support Iran in achieving this goal.
Washington can prevent such an outcome by abandoning maximalist objectives in this conflict. Instead, it should pursue a pragmatic middle path that limits Iran’s destabilizing capabilities while keeping diplomatic channels open and revitalizing American alliances.
The Iran war may produce no clear winner, but the US can ensure that neither China nor Russia emerges claiming victory.
Damage to American credibility
However, the most harmful consequence of the Iran war—and the greatest advantage for Russia and China—is the weakening of the concept of a US-led international order.
Since the early days of the Cold War, the US has presented itself as the leader of the free world, and building and expanding that order has been a central pillar of its foreign policy.
Over time, the US has often shown extraordinary generosity toward its allies and partners in exchange for their support. It has done so based on the belief that close cooperation among like-minded nations would promote prosperity, economic integration, reduce interstate conflict, and yield returns far greater than the investment.
This same thinking enabled President George H.W. Bush’s administration to lead a coalition of 41 countries in 1991 to expel Iraq from Kuwait.
President George W. Bush followed a similar path by organizing a coalition of 51 countries in 2001 to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. His successor, Barack Obama, brought together 85 countries in a global coalition starting in 2014 to defeat ISIS.
Such coalition-based projects have always been a concern for Moscow and Beijing. Their objection is not limited to NATO—they fundamentally oppose the concept of formal alliances with mutual defense commitments.
Both Russia and China are powerful states, yet they lack formal allies. They prefer a fragmented world based on bilateral relationships, where they can operate as dominant powers without binding commitments.
They believe that in a world full of alliances, they are always at a disadvantage in any conflict with the United States. This is because US allies can inflict far greater damage on Russia and China than their own partners can inflict on the US.
However, the US war against Iran is now weakening the very principle that has long justified American alliances: its role as the leader of a rules-based order.
A diplomatic exit
In this context, the right strategy for the United States is neither maximal war nor abrupt withdrawal. Washington should aim for a practical balance: preventing Iran from undertaking major destabilizing actions, restoring a credible diplomatic pathway, and ensuring the conflict does not become the kind of endless regional war that Moscow and Beijing desire.
If the US defines success as humiliating Iran or collapsing the Islamic Republic, it will likely achieve the opposite outcome—an even more aggressive Iran, more closely aligned with Russia and China, and a lasting blow to American legitimacy.
This means Washington must combine deterrence with a realistic diplomatic exit strategy. It should signal readiness to establish a new, mutually beneficial modus vivendi with Iran.
One option could be the creation of a US-led consortium for uranium enrichment on an Iranian island in the Persian Gulf.
This would provide Iran with a face-saving way to preserve its nuclear capabilities while preventing weaponization. Such an arrangement could also bind both sides of the Gulf into a cooperative framework.
Another option would be negotiating a non-aggression pact with Tehran. Critics of war may view this as weakness, while hardliners may argue it falls short of demanding full Iranian surrender.
In reality, this approach aligns with both the balance of power and the balance of interests. Iran is too weak to dominate the region, yet too resilient, networked, and strategically significant to be subdued through bombing at an acceptable cost to the US.
Washington must also repair the political foundations of its regional policy. This includes closer coordination with European allies, continuous consultation with Gulf partners, and reducing inflammatory rhetoric that risks alienating necessary alliances.
The true test of American statecraft is not whether it can destroy Iran’s capabilities, but whether it can reintegrate Iran into the global economy and create conditions in which it no longer poses a major threat to its neighbors.
Doing so would reduce the incentive for regional states to tilt toward Beijing and prevent Moscow from gaining another geopolitical advantage.
The US must avoid becoming trapped in another prolonged war that drains its resources and credibility while benefiting its rivals. Instead, it should adopt a limited and disciplined strategy that reduces tensions in the Gulf, restores freedom of navigation, and gives Tehran alternatives to complete dependence on Moscow and Beijing.
In this competition, restraint is not passivity—it is power used with purpose.
